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THISARTICLE OFFERS A FORMAL READING of a classification scheme of in- 
ternational scope and long duration: the International Classijication ofDis- 
eases (ID). The argument is made that this classification scheme retains 
many traces of its own administrative and organizational past in its cur- 
rent form. Further, it is argued that such traces operate normatively to 
favor certain kinds of narrative of medical treatment while denying oth- 
ers. It is suggested that the ICD, like other large-scale classification sys- 
tems, is able to do its work so effectively precisely because these traces 
permit a coupling of classification scheme and organizational form. 
INTRODUCTION 
In so far as the coding scheme establishes an orientation toward the 
world, it constitutes a structure of intentionality whose proper locus 
is not the isolated, Cartesian mind, but a much larger organizational 
system, one that is characteristically mediated through mundane 
bureaucratic documents such as forms. (Goodwin, 1996, p. 65) 
In the digital libraries that are being constructed today, a burgeoning 
number of formal classification systems are being inscribed deep into the 
infrastructure of the information system. 
In this discussion, some medical classification systems with a long 
history will be examined-notably the International Classijiication of Diseases 
( I D - P C M ,1996; ICD-l0,1992), in operation since the 1890s-in order to 
discern the relationship between the use of the classification as an infor- 
mation storage and retrieval mechanism and its use to encode multiple 
political and ethical agendas. 
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One classic division between kinds of classification system is that drawn 
by Taylor (1995), who distinguishes between Aristotelian classification and 
prototype classification. The prototype classification was defined by ex- 
perimental psychologist Eleanor Rosch (1978). This distinction is going 
to be an important one throughout this discussion and will be explored in 
some detail. An Aristotelian classification works according to a set of bi- 
nary characteristics, which the object being classified either presents or 
does not present. At each level of classification, enough binary features 
are adduced to place any member of a given population into one, and 
only one, class. So we might say that a pen is an object for writing within a 
population consisting of pens, balls, and bottles (Taylor, 1995). We would 
have to add in one more feature in order to adequately distinguish pens, 
for example, from pencils, balls, or bottles. A technical classification sys- 
tem operating by binary characteristics is called monothetic if a single set 
of necessary and sufficient conditions is adduced (“in the universe of poly- 
gons, the class of triangles consists of figures that have three sides”), 
polythetic if a number of shared characteristics are used (in our example, 
the pen could be described as thin, cylindrical, used for writing, has a ball 
point, and so forth) (Blois, 1984). Desrosi2res (1993) indicates a typical 
breakdown between monothetic and polythetic classifications in the work 
of statisticians. He associates the former with Linnaeus and the latter with 
Buffon (who engaged in local classification practices, just using the set of 
traits needed to make a determination in a specific instance) and writes: 
“These local practices are often carried out by those working in statistical 
centers, according to a division of labor whereby the chiefs are inspired by 
Linnaean precepts but the working statisticians apply, without realizing it, 
Buffon’s method” (p.  296 [authors’ translation] ) . Aristotelian models- 
monothetic or polythetic-have traditionally informed formal classifica- 
tion theory in a broad range of sciences, including biological systematics, 
geology, and physics. 
Rosch’s (1978) prototype theory argues that, in daily life, our classifi- 
cations tend to be much fuzzier than we might at first think. We do not 
deal with a set of binary characteristics when we decide that this thing we 
are sitting on is a chair. Indeed, it is possible to name a population of 
objects that people would in general agree to call chairs that have no two 
binary features in common. 
According to prototype theory, there is a broad picture in our minds 
of what a chair is, and this picture is extended by metaphor and analogy 
when trying to decide if any given thing that we are sitting on counts. We 
call up a best example and then see if there is a reasonable direct or meta- 
phorical thread that takes us from the example to the object under con- 
sideration. Prototype theory has been powerfully developed within the 
field of sociolinguistics by George Lakoff (1987) and John Taylor (1995). 
One finding of the theory is that different social groups tend to have quite 
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different prototypes in mind when classifylng something-e.g., a piece of 
furniture. Thus, when surveyed, a group of Germans came up consis- 
tently with a different set of best examples than a group of Americans 
(Taylor, 1995, pp. 4457). For the Americans, chair and sofa are best fits 
for furniture, for the Germans, asked about mobel, it was bed and table. 
An important implication of the theory is that there are levels at which 
we most easily and naturally distinguish between objects in the world, and 
that supervenient or subvenient levels tend to be more technically de- 
fined. Looking at a picture of a Manx coon cat, a nonexpert will say that 
this is a picture of a cat. An expert might call it either a Manx coon cat or 
a vertebrate. 
This distinction between two main types of classification is a very use- 
ful one. However, there are a number of reasons for saying that it is not 
an absolute distinction-indeed, one could say that we all probably have a 
personal prototype of the ideal Aristotelian classification system, but that 
no one system in practice fully meets a single set of Aristotelian require- 
ments. We stress “in practice” here, since it is practice that this discussion 
is largely about. Turning to an example from the workplace, it is possible 
to begin to see how practice and location mediates such divisions. In the 
medical arena, it emerged from a survey of physicians in 1979 in the United 
Kingdom that general practitioners “had a constant tendency to regard a 
wider range of phenomena as disease” than the hospital physicians, who 
in turn were more inclusive than the lay public-the perceived need for 
medical intervention being the determining axis (Prins, 1981, p. 176; 
Campbell, Scadding, & Roberts, 1979). An influential factor, Prins notes, 
seems to have been whether or not medical intervention was required. 
For the lay public, “measles” and “mumps” might be prototypical diseases, 
but “arthritis,” a card-carrying ICD-10 (1992) disease, might be seen rather 
as a condition. 
Sowhy do we seem in practice prototypical even if in principle Aristo- 
telian? For two main reasons: (1)because each classification system is 
tied to a particular set of coding practices, and (2) because classification 
systems in general (we are not making this as an ex cathedra pronounce-
ment) reflect the conflicting contradictory motives of the sociotechnical 
situations that gave rise to them. 
PRACTICES 
Consider the International Classvication of Diseases (ICD-9-CM, 1996; 
ICD-10, 1992). When originally drawn up, it had a maximum of 200 cat- 
egories, not because this was the number of diseases in the world but 
because this had been the number of lines on Austrian census forms. If 
too many diseases got identified, then there would be no way of maintain- 
ing and analyzing registers of causes of death as the technology would not 
hold more information. 
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In addition to this inheritance, there is a practical Occam’s razor. 
When doctors come to code causes of death, they are frequently faced 
with a set of difficultjudgments (that may require an autopsy and further 
diagnostic work). They can simply go for the easiest solution-i.e., by 
using a generalized “other” category They can then get back to dealing 
with their live patients (Fagot-Largeault, 1989). So the classical beauty of 
the Aristotelian classification gives way to a fuzzier classification system 
that shares inpractice key features with commonsense prototype classifica- 
tions-i.e., heterogeneous objects linked by metaphor or analogy. 
The powerful habits of practice with respect to the humble tasks of 
filling out forms are often neglected in studies of classifying. Goodwin 
( 1996) provides an elegant description of working student archaeologists 
matching patches of earth against a standard set of color patches-the 
Munsell color charts. He notes that earlier cognitive anthropological work 
on color assumed a universal genetic origin for color recognition but failed 
to examine the kinds of practices that informed the ways in which color 
tests were designed and carried out in the course of this research. Goodwin 
(1996) notes: 
Rather than standing alone as self-explicating textual objects, forms 
are embedded within webs of socially organized situated practices. 
In order to make an entry in the slot provided for color an archae- 
ologist must make use of another tool, the set of standard color 
samples provided by a Munsell chart. This chart incorporates into a 
portable physical object the results of a long history of scientific in- 
vestigation of the properties of color. The version of this chart that 
archaeologists bring into the field has been tailored to the distinc- 
tive requirements of their work situation. (p. 66) 
The archaeologists constantly compare the pieces of earth against the chart, 
negotiate with each other, and transform their everyday terms for the earth 
into the formal numbered categories on the chart. The uncertainties 
they face along the way are removed once the numbers are selected and 
reported: “The definitiveness provided by a coding scheme typically erases 
from subsequent documentation the cognitive and perceptual uncertain- 
ties that these students are grappling with, as well as the work practices 
within which they are embedded” (Goodwin, 1996, p. 78). 
CONTRADICTORY OFEQUIREMENTS 
CLASSIFICATION IN GENERALSYSTEMS 
Classification systems in general inherit contradictory motives in the 
circumstances of their creation. This is very clearly illustrated by items in 
the ICD covering such charged ethical or religious issues as abortion or 
stillbirth. Over the years, defining the moment of birth differed radically 
from Protestant to Catholic countries and with technological changes. The 
final definitions given in the ICD directly reflect the charged political and 
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ethical atmosphere of the subject, distinguishing, for example, legal and 
illegal abortion as separate categories. In this sense, the ICB can also be 
read as a kind of treaty, a bloodless set of numbers obscuring the behind- 
the-scenes battles informing its creation. This dryness itself contains an 
implicit authority, seeming to rise above uncertainty, power struggles, and 
the impermanence of the compromises. 
Indeed, one might observe that technical classification schemes are 
constructed in such a way as to fit our commonsense prototypical picture 
of what a technical classification is. Thus when the International Com- 
mittee for the Nomenclature of Viruses, to which we shall return, floated 
the idea of using “sig1as”-a series of code letters attached to the virus 
name to indicate its characteristics-Matthews (1983) describes the re- 
sponse as follows: “Leading virology journals were only lukewarm to try 
out cryptogram ideas. Among comments from this period: ‘Why should 
they be given funny names? Are we not exposing ourselves to the laughter 
of the general public? Do we want to join the ranks of old-fashioned 
botanists and zoologists so soon?”’ (pp. 13-14). A good technical classifi- 
cation should not only be correct in Aristotelian terms, it should, in good 
prototypical fashion, look and feel scientific. This is not an isolated case. 
The developers of the Nursing Interventions Classification (NIC) have 
made similar observations-e.g., they initially did not classify “leech 
therapy” not because it was not a scientific intervention but because it did 
not look and feel like one. With respect to the ICD, there has been a long 
debate within the patient community about naming chronic fatigue syn- 
drome, for example (as there was for AIDS). Consider this discussion 
among patients suffering from chronic fatigue syndrome: 
Many patients feel that one of the greatest burdens of having chronic 
fatigue syndrome is the name of the illness. The word “fatigue” (which 
many patients refer to as the “ Fword) indicates everyday tiredness. 
It reinforces negative perceptions that remain with the public and 
most medical doctors, despite a decade of steady, gradual research 
advances.( Chronic Fatigue Syndrome Electronic Newsletter, 20 February, 
1997) 
One option was to name it after Darwin, but it was felt that, although he 
had the scientific cachet, he did not necessarily have the disease. Inversely, 
Florence Nightingale’s diagnosis is more certain but less prestigious: 
Nightingale’s. (A general note: no historical figure has been defini- 
tively diagnosed with CFS/M.E. Purists may object to choosing any 
person in history, who may not have actually had the disease, as the 
basis for an eponym.) Florence Nightingale is a widely respected and 
world-renowned figure who founded the International Red Cross and 
the first formal school for nursing. For decades she had an undiag- 
nosed, severely debilitating, illness with symptoms similar to CFS. 
Despite Nightingale’s considerable talents and her personal charac- 
ter, many doubted that she had a physical illness. Her illness was 
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quite controversial. A 1996 paper by D.A.B.Young that appeared in 
the British MedicalJournalindicates that Nightingale’s illness was likely 
to have been chronic brucellosis (a disease with symptoms similar 
but not identical to CFS). Patient groups have promoted Nightingale’s 
birthday, May 12, as International CFIDS/M.E. Awareness Day, and 
Nightingale is a familiar symbol to those who know this disease. 
However, some argue that women’s diseases often have difficulty in 
getting recognized and accepted. Choosing Nightingale’s name as 
an eponym might add to, rather than offer relief from, current name- 
associated problems. ( ChronicF a h p e  SyndromeElectronic Newsletter, 20 
February 1997) 
More generally, Taylor, from a linguistic perspective, and Durkheim and 
Mauss (1968) (for whom primitive social classifications “seem to link, with- 
out any discontinuity, with the first scientific classifications” [p.821) from 
an anthropological one have observed that our technical classifications 
grow out of, and have to answer to, commonsense socially comfortable 
classifications. It just would not be socially feasible to call a donkey a fish 
no matter how good your scientific grounds. 
There is no great divide between folk and scientific classifications. 
Below, we discuss one particular fault line between the two: a fracture that 
is constantly being redefined and changing its nature as the plate of lived 
experience is subducted under the crust of scientific knowledge. This 
fault line is the ways in which temporal experience-i.e., history, experi- 
ence, development, memory, evolution-is registered in, and expressed 
by, two formal classification systems-the ICD and the INV. The crack 
comes when the messy flow of bodily and natural experience must be 
ordered against a formal neat set of categories. We will trace this particu- 
lar faultline across the two classification schemes. It is the case that all 
complex classification schemes in fact have multiple sets of faults and frac- 
tures arising from similar tensions. On a meta level, the system of faults 
and tensions forms a kind of texture of any given organizational terrain; 
mapping this texture is a major research challenge for the field of social 
informatics. 
THEINTERNATIONAL OF DISEASESCLASSIFICATI N IS A 
PRAGMATICLASSIFICATION 
In order to communicate information in the aggregate, it must first 
be classified. At any time over the past 100years, one can find complaints 
about the Tower of Babel that afflicts the storage and communication of 
medical knowledge.’ David Rothwell (1985) notes that: 
More than two hundred statistical systems are being used by the 
United States government to monitor health, occupational and 
environmental conditions through the country. Despite the incred- 
ible amount of information accumulated, there is no method of co-
ordinating these data into a single coherent database, a national 
health information system. (p. 169) 
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Mark Musen (1992) complains: 
The medical-informatics community suffers from a failure to com- 
municate. The terms that WMR uses to describe patient findings 
generally are not recogni~ed by Medline. The manner in which Iliad 
stores descriptions of diseases is different from that of Dxplain. 
Therapy plans generated by ONCOCIN are meaningless to the HELP 
system. . . . Each time another developer describes yet another for- 
malism for encoding medical knowledge, the number of incompat- 
ibilities among these different systems increases exponentially. (p. 
435) 
Musen indicates that there is no clear relationship between “the Unified 
Medical Language System [UMLS] advanced by the National Library of 
Medicine and the Arden syntax proposed by the American Society for 
Testing and Materials as a standard for representing medical knowledge” 
(p. 436). The ICD, he points out, originated as a means for describing 
causes of death; a trace of its heritage is its continued difficulty with de- 
scribing chronic, as opposed to acute, forms of disease. This is one basis 
for the temporal faultlines that emerge in its usage. The UMLS origi- 
nated as a means of information retrieval (the MeSH scheme) and is not 
as sensitive to clinical conditions as it might be (p. 440). 
The two basic problems for any overarching classification scheme in a 
rapidly changing and complex field can be described as follows: first, any 
classificatory decision made now might, by its nature, block valuable fu- 
ture developments. Ifwe decide that all instances of Sudden Infant Death 
Syndrome are to be placed into a single box (IcD-l0,1992, vol. 1,R95, p. 
890), then we are not recording information that might be used by future 
researchers to distinguish possible multiple social or environmental causes 
of the syndrome. We are not making it impossible to carry out such stud- 
ies, but we are making it difficult to retrieve information. Second, in- 
versely, if every possible relevant piece of information was stored in the 
scheme it would be entirely unwieldy. 
The decision not to collect is the most difficult for any classification 
on these grounds, whether it be the acquisition department of a library, 
the curator of an art museum, or the collector of information for vital 
statistics. There are always practical budget and storage issues. These are 
balanced against two other factors: (1) the need for a well ordered and, in 
some sense, parsimonious repository that can be used, and (2) the side 
bets that are made about what material will be useful in the future. This 
latter is particularly difficult. 
Collectors and curators of all sorts must become future forecasters 
and decide the boundaries of what will be useful for the future. There is 
no perfect answer, only a set of practical tradeoffs. This is a problem that 
has plagued museums of natural history, for example. Fossils found in 
the nineteenth century might come along with general information about 
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the depth at which they were discovered and the surrounding geological 
features (though they often did not). Even if this information was in- 
cluded, it was never as precisely noted as would be useful for geologists 
and paleontologists today since there was just no conception at that stage 
of the kinds of dating techniques that are used today. The museum is 
then faced with the choice between recording as much as possible now 
(which is very expensive and possibly not useful anyway) and having the 
collection perhaps last longer into the future or recording a judicious 
amount now (which will keep the administrative costs down) and having 
the collection possibly be not so useful in the future. The latter has gen- 
erally been the de facto choice and is generally a reasonable one to have 
made since new criteria of relevance just cannot be predicted. 
Different designers of the classification system have different needs- 
and the shifting ecology of relationships between the disciplines using the 
classification will necessarily be reflected in the scheme itself. As with the 
insurance company example above, these relationships must be resolved 
in order to make a usable form, often obscuring power relationships in 
the process. As Goodwin (1996) notes: “A quite different kind of 
multivocality, one organized by the craft requirements of a work task rather 
than the genres of the literary academy, can be found in mundane bu- 
reaucratic forms” (p. 66). But one must dig to find the voices. The pro- 
cess of filling out the forms may further obscure them. For example, the 
designers of the ICD recommend that its classification scheme be inter- 
preted economically: 
The condition LO be used for single-condition morbidity analysis is 
the main condition treated or investigated during the relevant epi- 
sode of health care. The main condition is defined as the condition, 
diagnosed at the end of the episode of health care, primarily respon- 
sible for the patient’s need for treatment or investigation. If there is 
more than one such condition, the one held most responsible for 
the greatest use of resources should be selected. . . . ( Z C D - l O ,  1992, 
vol. 2 ,  p. 96) 
This reflects a constant condition of the use of the ICD; it has been rec- 
ommended throughout its history that priority should be given to coding 
diseases that represent a threat to public health. This goal is clearly a 
good one; equally clearly it can discriminate selectively against the report- 
ing of rare noncontagious conditions. 
Faced with these problems, the WHO has been consistently pragmatic 
in its aims and clear in its explanations of the ICD. From the time of the 
ninth revision on, it has been recognized explicitly that “the ICD alone 
could not cover all the information required and that only a ‘family’ of 
disease and health related classifications would meet the different require- 
ments in public health” (IDC-10, 1992, vol. 2, p. 20). This “family” is pic- 
tured in ICD-10 (see Figure I ) .  
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Figure 1. Diagram of Family of Disease and Health Related Classifications (Source: 
IW-10, 1992, V O ~ .2, p. 4). 
The family itself is a diverse one: there are various standard modifica- 
tions of the ID. The most significant is the ICD-PCM (1996) where CM 
stands for “clinical modification.” This has a complex history, originating 
in the development of modifications of the IDfor use in hospital infor- 
mation systems. It is now the classification of record in a wide variety of 
medical settings and is used for billing, insurance, and administration as 
well as in-patient medical records. This institutional entrenchment has 
made it very difficult for ID-10  (1992) to be fully adopted in the United 
States with the clinical modification necessarily lagging behind the pro- 
duction of the classification itself. 
264 LIBRARY TRENDS/FAI,L, 1998 
When we observe the ways in which culture and practice interweave 
in the text of the ICD, we are not unmasking a false pretender to the 
crown of science. We are drawing attention to an explicit positive feature 
of ICD design: “The ICD has developed as a practical, rather than a purely 
theoretical classification. . . . There have . . .been adjustnients to meet the 
variety of statistical applications for which the ICD is designed, such as 
mortality, morbidity, social security and other types of health statistics and 
surveys” (ICD-10, 1992, vol. 2, p. 12). The preamble to the classification 
defines a classification of diseases as “a system of categories to which mor- 
bid entities are assigned according to established criteria” (ZCD-10, 1992, 
vol. 1,p. 1). A statistical classification, such as the ICD, “must encompass 
the entire range of morbid conditions within a manageable number of 
categories” (ICD-10,vol. 2, p. 1). It is not meant to be a net to capture all 
knowledge but a workable epidemiological tool. This practical goal does 
not make it less scientific, of course; all classification systems are devel- 
oped within a context of’organizational practice. The goal of the ICD’s 
designers is to create what Latour (1988) has called immutable mobiles- 
inscriptions that may travel unchanged and be combinable and compa- 
rable. Indeed, the term “immutable mobile” might almost have been in 
the designers’ minds when they wrote: 
The purpose of the ICll is to permit the systematic recording, analy- 
sis, interpretation, and comparison of mortality and morbidity data 
collected in different countries or areas and at different times. The 
ICD is w e d  to translate diagnoses of diseases and other health prob- 
lems from words into an alphanumeric code, which permits easy stor- 
age, retrieval, and analysis of the data. (ZCll-10, 1992, vol. 2, p. 2) 
The ICD has become the international tool for “standard diagnostic classi- 
fication for all general epidemiological and many health management 
purposes” (p. 2 ) .  
The world has changed since the ICD was first introduced, and the 
classification scheme has evolved to try to encompass these changes. The 
ICD is thus both highly responsive and tightly constrained. A large-scale 
change in the way that people die (Israel, Rosenberg, & Curtin, 1986, p. 
161) has led to an alteration in one line in the internationally recom- 
mended Death Certificate. This is, of course, one of the main bureaucratic 
uses ofthe ICL)-i.e., the recording and compiling of causes of death from 
bureaus of vital statistics via coroners, hospitals, doctors, or priests: 
In considering the international form of medical certificate of cause 
of death, the Expert (hmmittee had recognized that the situation of 
an aging population with a greater proportion of deaths involving 
multiple disease processes, and the effects of associated therapeutic 
interventions, tended to increase the number of possible statements 
between the underlying cause and the direct cause of death: this 
meant that an increasing number of conditions were being entered 
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on death certificates in many countries. This led the committee to 
recommend the inclusion of an additional line (d) in Part 1 of the 
certificate. (ICD-10,1996,vol. 1,p. 18) 
Thus there is now one more blank line on the form to indicate multiple 
causation (see Figure 2). 
Cause of Death Approximate  
interval 
between o n s e t  
and death 
I 
Disease or condition directly (a).. . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  
leading to death* 
due to (or as a consequence of') 
Anterpdent  causes  (b). . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  
Morbid conditions, if any, 
giving rise to the above cause, due to (or as a consequence of') 
stating the underlying 
condition last (c). . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  
(d). . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  

I1 
Other significant conditions . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  . .  

Contributing to the death, but  

not related to the disease or 

condition causing it . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  . .  

* This does not mean the mode ofdying-e.g., heart failure, respiratory failure. It 
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(otherwise there would have been too many cases). The National Tuber- 
culosis Association’s ( 1955) edition of Diagnostic Standards and Classijica- 
tion of Tuberculosis notes that new laboratory tests had made it more diffi- 
cult to decide whether a particular case of TB was active or inactive- 
activity could now be seen at sites previously considered inactive, and yet 
one would not necessarily want to call the “new” active sites cases of TB 
since they very well may not progress to the point of needing treatment. 
The committee cites the 1955 version of the book: 
The Committee, however, recognizes the fact that all classifications 
are ephemeral. They are useful only as long as they serve their pur- 
pose. The purpose of a clinical classification of tuberculosis is, how- 
ever, a most important one. On it depend such matters as legal re- 
quirements for isolation, medico-legal considerations with respect to 
compensation for disability, standards for the return of patients to 
work, and similar matters. (p. 6) 
For another example, the discovery of the lentiviruses led to the descrip- 
tion of a new set of disease entities-i.e., slow acting viruses from which 
one could suffer asymptomatically for extended periods. 
In the interests of creating a working infrastructure, Aristotelian prin- 
ciples are deliberately violated: 
C15 Malignant neoplasms of oesophagus 

Note: Two alternative subclasszfications are pven:  

.0 - .2 by anatomical description 

.3 - .5 by thirds 

This departure from the principle that categories should be mutual& exclusive is 
deliherale since both forms of terminology are in use, but the resulting anatomical 
divisions are not analogous (ICD-10, 1992, vol. 1,p. 190). 
Where the state of the art is unclear, so is the scheme itself: 
Note: The terms used in categories C82-C85 for non-Hiodgkin’s lym- 
phomas are those of the Working Formulation, which attempted to 
find common ground among several major classification schemes. 
The terms used in these schemes are not given in the Tabular List 
but appear in the Alphabetical Index; exact equivalence with the 
terms appearing in the Tabular List is not always possible. 
Includes: morpholqgy codes M959M994 with behauiour code /3. 
Excludes: secondary and unspecified neoplasm of (ymph nodes (C77.4. 
(ICD-10, 1992, v01. 1, p. 215) 
There are several specialty-based adaptations of the ICD originating in 
different national or international bodies (dermatology, stemming from 
the British Association of Dermatologists, and, under development, 
rheumatology and orthopaedics from the International League against 
Rheumatism) (ICD-IU, 1992, vol. 2, pp. 5-6). 
The 1 0  is also directly responsive to changes in the world. Diseases 
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themselves die (smallpox), are superseded (Gay-Related Immune Disor- 
der becomes AIDS), are newly born (radiation sickness with the discovery 
of radium), or fall into disrepute (hysteria or neurasthenia). Since this is 
a statistical classification, a disease with no incidence is of no interest. 
Thus smallpox was still well defined within ZCD-PCM (1996): 
050 Small@ox 
Excludes: arthropod-borne viral diseuses (060.0-066.9) 
Boston exanthem (048) 
50.1 Variola major 




50.2 Modzfied smalkox 
Varioloid 
050.9 Small@ox, unspeczfied (ICD-9-CM, 1996, vol. 1,p. 11). 
By the time ZCD-10 was developed, this had collapsed into “ B 0 3  Small-
pox” with a footnote: “In 1980 the 33‘dworld Health Assembly declared 
that smallpox had been eradicated. The classification is maintained for 
surveillance purposes” (ICD-10,1992, vol. 1,p. 150). Or again, malnutri- 
tion is defined in relativistic fashion-as the population changes so does 
the definition: 
The degree of malnutrition is usually measured in terms of weight, 
expressed in standard deviations from the mean of the relevant ref- 
erence population. When one or more previous measurements are 
available, lack of weight gain in children, or evidence of weight loss 
in children or adults, is usually indicative of malnutrition. When 
only one measurement is available, the diagnosis is based on prob- 
abilities and is not definitive without other clinical or laboratory tests. 
In the exceptional circumstances that no  measurement of weight is 
available, reliance should be placed on clinical evidence. (ICD-10, 
1992,vol. 1, p. 290) 
In these cases, then, the fact that the world is changing is reflected di- 
rectly in the classification scheme. Another source for this recognition is 
of course the development of accident categories that also display in their 
explanations a historical cultural specificity. For example, this set of acci- 
dent categories describes a series of tumbles more common in the indus- 
trial world than for a nomadic tribe: 
E884 Other fall from one leuel to another 
E884.0 Fall from playground equipment 
Excludes: recreational machinery (E919.8) 
E884.1 Fall from cliff 
E884.2 Fall from chair 
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E884.3 Fall from wheelchazr 
E884.4 Fall from bpd 
E884.5 Fullfrom other furniturp 
E884.6 Fall from commode 
Toalet 
E884.9 OthPrfall from one leuel to another 
Fall from: Fall from: 
embankment stataonary uphacle 
haqstack tree (ICD-PCM, 1996, vol. 1,p. 289). 
There is a relatively impoverished vocabulary for talking about natu- 
ral accidents-the ICD is richest in its description of ways of dying in de- 
veloped countries at this moment in history. It is not that other accidents 
and diseases cannot be described, but these cannot be described as well. 
Differentiating insect and snake bites, for example, is very important for 
those living in the rural tropics. However, while arthropods, centipedes, 
and chiggers are singled out under “bites” in the ICD index, snakes are 
only divided into venomous and nonvenomous, as are spiders.’ Clearly 
this makes sense to some extent, given that this is a pragmatic classifica- 
tion. There is only a point in making fine distinctions between types of 
accident if those distinctions might make a difference in practice to some 
agency-medical or other. Simultaneously, those agencies have tradition- 
ally been more accountable to Western allopathic medicine and to the 
industrial world than to traditional systems. 
So the ICD bears traces of its history as a tool used by public health 
officials in developed countries. It also reflects changes in the world at 
large-either the eradication of diseases or culturally charged changing 
understandings of certain conditions. Further, it is very much an en- 
trenched scheme. There is a natural reluctance to make changes since 
each renders a previous set of statistics incomparable and hence less useful. 
The first and last entries in the ICD describe a sociotechnical trajec- 
tory. The first disease in the ICD over the years has been cholera, 
unsurprising since cholera was the issue that, in the 185Os, brought 
participants to the table in an attempt to deal with this international threat. 
As we noted in the introduction, this threat was exacerbated by the devel- 
opment of steamship technology, which allowed cholera sufferers to carry 
the disease further before dying. The last condition given in the book 
takes us to the other end of the sociotechnical arc-i.e., the creation of 
cyborgs. The last condition listed in the ICD is Z99, “Dependence on 
enabling machines and devices, not elsewhere classified,” with the very 
last entry, 299.9, being “Dependence on unspecified enabling machine 
and device” (ICD-10, 1992, vol. 1,p. 1175). By some standard, we all now 
qualify for the 299.9 condition. 
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The original sequence produced by William Farr (1885) is reproduced 
in the latest ICD: 
The ICD is a variable-axis classification. The structure has devel- 
oped out of that proposed by William Farr in the early days of inter-
national discussions on classification structures. His scheme was 
that, for practical epidemiological purposes, statistical data on dis- 
eases should be grouped in the following way: 
epidemic diseases 

constitutional or general diseases 





injuries. (p. 232) 

This pattern can be identified in the chapters of I D 1 0  (1992). It has 
stood the test of time and, though in some ways arbitrary, is still regarded 
as a more useful structure for general epidemiological purposes than any 
of the alternatives tested (ICD-10,1992, vol. 1,p. 13). 
This classification scheme, then, makes no exaggerated claims to time- 
less truth. On the contrary, its designers have attempted to paint a fluid 
picture of the world of disease-one which is sensitive to changes in the 
world, to sociotechnical conditions, and to the work practices of statisti- 
cians. 
THEREARE MANYAIDSTO STORYTELLINGIN THE ICD 
The classification system that is the ICD does more than provide a 
series of boxes in which to place diseases; it also encapsulates a series of 
stories, which are the preferred narratives of the ICD's designers. Certain 
attributions of intentionality are easy to make, others are rather difficult. 
Some ways of life are clearly considered to be well led, others are called 
into question. Sometimes context is important, sometimes it can be ig- 
nored. Stories also come and go, narratives fade in importance (viz. the 
example of AIDS moving, in medical terms, from a specifically gay-linked 
disease to a more general one). If one should have doubts about how to 
encode a given story, one can turn to volume 2 (ICD-10, 1992) of the 
classification, which gives an extensive set of rules for the interpretation 
of causes of death. In this section, we will observe the various aids to 
storytelling to be found within the ICD. 
The Setting 
Frequently, when diseases were first named, they took on the name of 
their first scientific describer, of a famous victim, or of the place where 
they occur. Each of these kinds of naming strategy tells a simple story to 
accompany the classification. Throughout the history of classification sys- 
tems over the past 200 years, such specifications have progressively been 
winnowed away to make way for new kinds of context and new kinds of 
description now considered more interesting and relevant. 
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What is known by many sufferers as Amyotrophic Lateral Sclerosis 
(Lou Gehrig’s Disease) is coded by the ICD-I0 (1992) as G12.2: Motor 
Neuron disease (p. 398). (With the famous physicist Stephen Hawking 
now suffering from the disease, it may in future be more well known to 
the lay public as Hawking’s Disease, as baseball player Lou Gehrig brought 
it to public awareness the first time.) In the index to the ICD, the Parisian 
neurologist Charcot can lay claim to an arthropathy (tabetic) ,a cirrhosis, 
a disease (tabetic arthropathy), and a syndrome. In the body of the text, 
Charcot’s name tends to slip away-i.e., Charcot’s syndrome becomes “173.9 
Peripheral vascular disease, unspecified”; there is no mention of Charcot 
(p.504). The 173s (Other peripheral vascular diseases) are an interesting 
category. They show the various forms of modality (173.0 is still proudly 
“Raynaud’s syndrome,” 173.1 is “thromboangiitis obliterans [Buerger]” 
(p. 503), 173.8 is “Other specified peripheral vascular diseases” and in- 
cludes “Acroparaesthesia-i.e., simple (Schultze’s type) or vasomotor 
(Nothnagel’s type)” (p. 504). In general, as the modalities get deleted, 
the name of the person goes from being the name of the disease to a 
bracket after the name, to an entry in the index, until finally it slides 
gracefully out of the index onto the scrap heap of history. A similar pro- 
cess occurs with deletion of detail and the uncertainties of discovery in 
any scientific publication, as Latour and Woolgar (1979) noted in their 
classic Laboratory Lqe. 
Places follow a similar path to abstraction and formal representation. 
The ideal ICD disease is not tied to a particular spot. It is rather identified 
with a particular causal agent. However, up to and including ICD-9-CM 
(1996), leishmaniasis was a classification that told a travelers’ tale-i.e., 
not only do we know what you got sick of but where you got sick: 
085 Leishmaniasis 
085.0 Visceral [kalaazar] 

Dumdum fever Leishmaniasis: 





infantum visceral (Indian) 

085.1 Cutaneous, urban 

Aleppo boil Leishmaniasis, 

Baghdad boil cutaneous: 

Delhi boil dryform 







085.2 Cutaneous, Asian desert 

Infection by Leishmania tropica major 







085.3 Cutaneous, Ethiopian 













Infection by Leishmania mexicana 

Leishmaniasis tegumentaria dqfusa 









Leishmaniasis, unspecified (ICD-PCM, 1996, p. 16) 
Similarly, for ICD-10 (1992), we can still find Delhi boil in the index, 
but the main entry itself is a svelte: 
B55 Leishmaniasis 
B55.0 Visceral bishmaniasis 
Kula-azar 
Post-kalu-azar dermal leishmaniasis 
B55.1 Cutaneous leishmaniasis 
B55.2 Mucocutaneous leishmaniasis 
B55.9 Leishmaniasis, unspectjied (ICD-10, 1992, vol. 1,p. 166) 
S o  we go from primacy being given to a place (Baghdad boil) to pri- 
macy being given to a kind of place (urban cutaneous) to primacy given 
to a universal agent. Gradually the narrative of travel inscribed in the 
patient's code, present earlier, is deleted. 
The loss of eponymy and place markers can, of course, be read as a 
story of the advance of science-the replacement of the local and specific 
with the general; the thing with the kind; the mutable immobile with the 
immutable mobile; and the concrete instance with the formal abstraction. 
However, another line of argument also deserves attention. As we have 
already seen, the ICD also reflects historical states of the world. The world 
has changed. With the huge increase in international travel over the past 
century and a half, it is more rare for a disease to be tied to a particular 
location-diseases themselves tend to spread to kinds of location. The 
malaria map of the world hanging on the wall at the WHO headquarters 
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in Geneva shows the expected tropical venues-and small red circles 
around major airports-as mosquitoes are transported from the tropics. 
We are, as a world, becoming more “abstract” in this way. 
Similarly, research now is not attributed to single great figures who 
can claim sole responsibility for a discovery. Medical work was always done 
in teams, but these have become larger, involving complex social and in- 
stitutional relationships of attribution as Gallo and Montaignier would be 
the first to remind us (in Grniek, 1990). A typical scientific article has so 
many authors that the death of the individual scientific author seems cer- 
tain. In general, the ICE1has gone from being the holder of a set of stories 
about places visited, heroic sufferers, and great doctors to holding an- 
other set of stories. 
The Context of Diseuse 
As people and places have moved out of eponymous and loconymous 
classification, they are replaced by a general set of categories-what we 
are calling the kindness of strangers. By this we mean that the classifica- 
tion system indicates a shift from our being individuals experiencing the 
world to our being kinds of people experiencing kinds of places. The 
constructions of social and natural science and of the legal world have 
nioved in. Broken legs and ski resort locations co-evolve as do cancer 
rates and toxic waste dumps. The classification system, as we shall see in 
this section, has become a site which holds these constructions together 
and, through excluding other kinds of story, makes them more real. With 
the ICD providing the main legitimate means for describing illness, the 
social, economic, and political stories woven into its fabric become, by 
extension, the main legitimate narrative threads for the science of medi- 
cine. 
Although particular places have moved out, two places have come to 
play a more significant role in the classification system-i.e., the labora- 
tory and the “sociological home.” The latter appears in the extra catego- 
ries developed for ICD-9 as supplemental codes, which in ICD-10 (1992) 
have become fully integrated-what we might call the context codes. Thus 
housing is one of the conditions that can be broken down and described 
as part of the classification. In ICD-PCM (1996) it is described as follows: 
V60 Housing, household and economic ciycumstances 
V60.0 Luck of housing 
Hobos Trunsients 
Social miffrants Vagabonds 
Tramps 
V60.1 Inadequate housing 
Lack of heating 
Restriction of space 
Technical defects in home preventing adequate care 
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V60.2 Inadequate material resources 
Economic problem Poverty NOS 

V60.3 Person living alone 

V60.6 Person lzving in residential institution 

Boarding school resident 
VGO.8 Other specified housing or economic circumstances 
V60.9 Unspecified housing or economic circumstances. (vol. 1,p. 267). 
The related code in ICD-10 (1992) is expanded to include discord with 
neighbors and lack of adequate food (vol. 1,p. 1152). In both, the name 
of the city gives way to the name of the social category and social condition. 
These context codes define what is considered to be medically rel- 
evant in one’s material surroundings. They make it easy to structure stud- 
ies in these terms (e.g., what effect does poor housing have on the inci- 
dence of tuberculosis). Simultaneously, they do make it much more diff- 
cult to deal with unrecognized contexts (what effect does conspicuous 
consumption have on cholesterol levels?). It is not impossible to do these 
latter studies, but the information is not “tohand” in the way that it is for 
medically sanctioned contexts. The reason for stressing this point is that 
it can be taken as a sign of the correctness of allopathic medicine that it 
has isolated the basic variables that must be taken into account in the 
development of public health policy or medical science. However, it is 
important to note that, although the ICDis a powerful tool, in this sense it 
also, as infrastructure, enforces a certain understanding of context, place, 
and time; it makes a certain set of discoveries (which validate its own frame- 
work) much more likely than an alternative set outside of the framework 
(since the economic cost of producing a study outside of the framework 
of normal data collection is necessarily much higher). 
This sort of convergence is an important feature of large-scale net- 
worked information systems. Star, Bowker, and Neumann (In press) de- 
fine convergence as: 
Convergence. . . is the double process by which information artifacts 
and social worlds are fitted to each other and come together. On the 
one hand, a given information artifact (a classification system, a da- 
tabase, an interface, and so forth) is partially constitutive of some 
social world. That is to say, the sharing of information resources and 
tools is a dimension of any coherent social world-be it the world of 
homeless people in Los Angeles sharing survival knowledge via street 
gossip, or the world of high-energy physicists sharing electronic pre- 
prints via the Los Alamos archive. On the other hand, any given 
social world itself generates many interlinked information artifacts. 
The social world creates through bricolage, a (loosely coupled but 
relatively coherent) set of information resources and tools. People 
without houses also log into the Internet, and physicists indulge in 
street gossip at conferences-as well as engage in a whole set of other 
information practices. Put briefly, information artifacts undergird 
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social worlds, and social worlds undergird these same information 
resources. We will use the concept of convergence to describe this 
process of mutual constitution. 
With these processes of convergence, the site of the medical work 
itself has gained in importance. The classification of tuberculosis, canoni- 
cally difficult to diagnose accurately (compare Latour, In press), retains 
the story of what has been done in the laboratory as well as what has OC-
curred in the body. 
A1 5 Respiratory tuberculosis, bacteriologically a n d  histologically 
confirmed 




fibrosis of lung I 
pneumonia } confirmed by sputum microscopy with or 
} without culture 
pneumothorax I 
A15.1 Tuberculosis of lung, confirmed by culture only 
Conditions listed in A15.0, confirmed by culture only 
A15.2 Tuberculosis of lung, confirmed histologically 
Conditions listed inA15.0, confirmed histolopally 
A15.3 Tuberculosis of lung, confirmed by unspeczfied means 
Conditions listed inA15.0, confirmed but unspecified whether bactm'olog2cally 
or histologically. ( Im-10,1992, vol. 1,p. 113) 
In this case, the disease itself is always classified in terms of the work 
that has been done in the medical laboratory. Again, as new technologies 
are invented, historical shifts occur, as with the relationship between epi- 
lepsy and the EEG machine as diagnostic many decades ago. 
The doctors themselves enter the story at the moment of classifica- 
tion, the patient rarely does. This comes out clearly if we compare mi- 
graine and epilepsy in ICD-PCM (1996). Epilepsy is a condition that is 
defined by the doctor in the context of laboratory and so is a real condi- 
tion: 
345 Epilepsy 
The following fifth-digzt subclassafication is for use with categories 3450,. 1.. 4- 
.9: 
0 without mention of intractable epilepsy 
1 with intractable epilepsy (ICD-PCM,1996, vol. 1,  p. 80) 
So here the question is whether or not the patient objectively has intrac- 
table epilepsy in the opinion of the doctor. The determination of 
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intractable migraine relies on the voice of the patient and so is marked as 
a suspicious designation: 
346 Migraine 
Thefollowing filth-digat subclassijkation isfor use with category 346: 
0 without mention of intractable migraine 
I with intractable migraine, so stated (ICD-PCM,vol. 1,p. 80) 
The laboratory context then is the “real” context of the disease; the classi- 
fication serves to reinforce the separation of the patient from ownership 
of their condition. We should note at this point that we are not arguing 
that this makes the ICD a tool for evil and oppression. On the contrary, 
what we are trying to do is work out what kind of a tool it is-i.e., what 
work it does and whose voice appears in the unfolding narrative. 
The legal context is often enfolded into the classification system. Thus 
the classification of blindness considers the American system of medical 
benefits: 
369 Blindness and low vision 
Note: visual impairment refers to a functional limitation of the eye (e.g., 
limited visual acuity or visualfield). It should be distinguished from visual 
disability, indicating a limitation of the abilities of the individual (e.g., lim- 
ited reading skills, vocational skills), and from visual handicap, indicating a 
limitation of personal and socioeconomic independence (e.g., limited ability, 
limited employment). 
The leuels of impairment defined in the table on page 92 are based on the 
recommendationsof the WHO Study Group on Prevention of Blindness (Geneua, 
November 6-1 0, 1972: WHO Technical Report Sm‘es 51S), and of the Interna- 
tional Council of Ophthalmology (1976). 
Note that definitions of blindness vary in different settings. 
For international reporting WHO defines blindness as profound impairment. 
This definition can be applied to blindness of one eye (369.1, 369.6) and to 
blindness of the individual (369.0). 
For determination of benefits in the USA, the definition of legal blindness as 
severe impairment is often used. This definition applies to blindness of the 
individual only. 
369.0 Profound impairment, both eyes 
369.00 Impairment level not further specijiied 
Blindness: 
NOS according to WHO definition 
both eyes 
369.3 Unqualqied visual loss, both eyes 
Excludes: blindness NOS: 

legal [USA definition] (369.4) 
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WHO definition (969.00) 
369.4 Legal blindness, as dt?fined in USA 
Blindness NOS according to USA definition 
Excludes legal blindness with specfication of impairment level 9369.01-369.08, 
369.11-369.14, 369.21-369.22). (ICL-PCM,1996, vol. 1,p. 91) 
Note in the above example that “blindness of the individual” might be 
psychogenic-i.e., due to brain damage or other organic cause outside 
the eye itself. The problem of localized versus “whole organism” condi- 
tions forms a serious source of coding problems. For example, depend- 
ing on one’s theory of cancer, it would be an immune disorder affecting 
the whole person or a localized phenomenon to be surgically removed 
with many gray areas in between for the different types of cancer. 
In the example above, the legal definition can take precedence over 
the cultural and social. Thus cannabis dependence has its own category, 
while the culturally profoundly different absinthe and glue addictions are 
combined: 






304.6 Other specvied drug dependence 
Absinthe addiction Glue sniffing 
Excludes: tobacco dependence (305.1)(ICD-PCM,1996,vol. 1,pp. 69-70) 
Few would argue that glue sniffing and absinthe addiction are similar 
phenomena. The Former leads to more serious physical conditions 
than “cannabis dependence” (a category many would challenge) and 
yet does not rate its own category. Absinthe addiction is, one suspects, 
a hangover from earlier days. Because the origins of the ICD were 
French and absinthe abuse an important problem in Paris in the nine- 
teenth century, it persists. These accidents of history, practice, and 
crime contain many clues to re-narrativizing the ICD. E970 to E979 in 
ICD-9-CM (1996) is an interesting set; it covers injuries caused by legal 
interventions: 
Legal Intervention: 
Includes: injuries inflicted by the police or other law-enforcing ugents, andud- 
ing military on duty, in the course of arresting or attempting to arrest 
lawbreakers, suppressing disturbance, maintain order and other legal action 
legal execution 
Excludes: injuries caused by civil insurrections (E990.0-E999)(ICD-PCM,vol. 
1, p. 304) 
This set includes state executions. Note that civil insurrections, where the 
definition of legal intervention is on the table, are classified together with 
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war. The definition of legal, of course, may be subject to its own retro- 
spective reconstruction, as in the case of Rodney King. 
Abortions, which may be to all intents and purposes the same medi- 
cally, are marked differently in the ICD according to their legality: 
635 Legally induced abortion 




Excludes: menstrual extraction or regulation (V25.3) 




self-induced (ICD-g-CM, 1996, vol. 1,  p. 154) 
Each type of abortion (spontaneous or 634, legally induced, illegally in- 
duced, unspecified, failed attempted, or 638) has the same set of compli- 
cations attached-i.e., nine difficulties, each accorded a digit (one of the 
most closely coded category sets in the ICD). When the issue arises, then, 
the ICD privileges the voice of the doctor and the laboratory over the 
voice of the patient and legal discourse over cultural and social discourse. 
One can read another order of social history from the nature of the si- 
lences in the story as well. 
In general, the ZCD carries with it its own context. This is a common 
feature of classification systems. One way of reading these is that they 
provide a stabilizing force between the natural and the social worlds. They 
hold in place sets of arrangements that allow one to read the natural as 
stable and objective and the social as tightly linked to it. For the ICD, this 
means describing disease in a way that folds the socially and legally con- 
tingent into the classification system itself and so naturalizes it. Inversely, 
the disease entity out there in the world is brought into the laboratory 
where the social and organizational work of its stabilization can best be 
guaranteed. 
CUTTINGUPTHE WORLD 
In order to tell stories of the sort with which we are most familiar, one 
needs objects in the world that can be cut up spatially (compare Berg & 
Bowker, 1997) and temporally into recognizable units. Narrative struc- 
tures are typically formed with a moving timeline, protagonists, and a dra- 
matic structure unfolding over time. The ICD does in fact operate this 
kind of dissection, which we will discuss later. In the last section, we saw 
the constitution of a context within the ICD, in this section we will see the 
constitution of actants to populate that context and those stories. 
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Time Story 1: The Life Cycle 
Temporally, the classification system provides a picture of acute 
(temporally bound) episodes within an otherwise well-ordered life. It is 
notoriously bad for describing chronic diseases; the interest is on the epi- 
sode of treatment (Musen, 1992). Let us go through some temporal units 
presented by the ICD. Birth is extremely important and is very closely 
defined: 
Live birth is the complete expulsion or extraction from its mother of 
a product of conception, irrespective of the duration of the preg- 
nancy, which, after such separation, breathes or shows any other evi- 
dence of life, such as heating of the heart, pulsation of the umbilical 
cord, or definite movement of voluntary muscles, whether or not the 
umbilical cord has been cut or the placenta is attached; each prod- 
uct ofsuch a birth is considered livehorn. (Zrn-10, 1992,vol. 2 ,p. 129). 
Time flows very quickly for the newborn, and so temporal units vary ac- 
cordingly: The neonatal period commences at birth and ends 28 com-
pleted days after birth. Neonatal deaths (deaths among live births during 
the first 28 completed days of life) may be subdivided into early neonatal 
deaths, occurring during the first seven days of life, and late neonatal 
deaths, Occurring after the seventh day but before 28 completed days of life. 
Age at death during the first day of life (day zero) should be re-
corded in units of completed minutes or hours of life. For the sec- 
ond (day l ) ,third (day 2) and through 27 completed days of life, 
age at death should be recorded in days. (ZCD-10, 1992, vol. 2 ,  p. 
131) 
Given the bump in mortality that occurs around birth, this is notsurprising. 
When adult life begins, things start to slow down. Adults are defined 
in ZCD-9-CM (1996, p. xiii) as people between 15 and 124 years old. If you 
make it to 125,you are “hors de categorie.” 
In the middle period, adulthood, there are some indications of what 
constitutes a good life. It should be well-ordered and rhythmic. Things 
should happen at the right time. Thus sexual development has its own 
timing: 
259 Other Endocrine disorders 
259.0 Delay in sexual deuelopment and puberty, not elsewhere classified 
Delayrd puberty 









idiopathic (Z[D-PCM, 1996, vol. 1,p. 51) 

Similarly, problems with temporal regulation of menstruation are well- 
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defined-i.e., too early, too late, too frequent, not frequent enough. Natu- 
ral rhythms should not be upset. 
A relatively recent temporal problem addition here is jet lag: 
307.45 Phase-ship disruption of 24-hour sleep-wake cycle 

Irregular sleep-wake rhythm, nonorganic origin 

Jet lag syndrome 

Rapid time-zone change 

Shifting sleep-work schedule. (ICD-9-CM, 1996, vol. 1,p. 71) 

The reference to the “nonorganic origin” highlights that this is a situa- 
tion-bound condition: the context (iet travel or night shift work) is di- 
rectly folded into the disease. 
To an outside observer, there is remarkably little reference to the 
process of aging. An adult is a timeless being who should be healthy; 
disease is not, in general, indexed by age. Further, the body is not present 
as something that gets used up and worn out; such stories have to be 
superadded (indeed the category of being “worn out” was in earlier addi- 
tions of the ICD but has since been removed). 
Ifyou rent a house, your agreement with the landlord includes a “fair 
use” or “normal wear and tear” category; it is expected that the house 
depreciates over time and this is written into the legal code. There are 
only two references to normal wear and tear in the whole ICD. First, one 
can, as an adult, step out of the well-ordered life and suffer from prema- 
ture or delayed senility, puberty, birth, and aging. Among the conditions 
under “delay” are delayed birth, development (including intellectual, learn- 
ing, reading, sexual, speech, and spelling), menstruation, and puberty. 
In this case, the cycle structure is the same, but the patient is taking the 
steps too early or too late. Second-and there is only one example of 
this-you could use your body badly. The only specific instance of this, 
however, is that you can grind or otherwise mismanage your teeth: 
521 Diseases of hard tissues of teeth 
... 
521.1 	Excessive attrition 

Approximal wear: Occlusal wear (ICD-9, vol. 1,p. 125) 

In ICB-10, abrasion of teeth carries with it an illuminating set of con- 
texts: dentifrice, habitual, occupational, ritual, and traditional. Occupa- 
tional abrasion in earlier times included the hazard “tailor’s tooth,” for 
example, where the teeth were abraded due to biting off the thread for 
hand sewing. In principle, the timeless adult could do many things exces- 
sively. There are categories for excessive thirst, secretion, salivation, sex 
drive, sweating, and binocular convergence among others. However, that 
superfluity is, only in this one case, indexed against an aging body. Note 
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that there are, of course, diseases associated more broadly and often im- 
plicitly with excessive wear and tear-e.g., cirrhosis of the liver associated 
with alcoholic excess. But here we are concerned directly with the repre- 
sentation in the classification system. 
This curious invisibility of aging as wear and tear is one way in which 
the ICD stabilizes context and disease entity-the human body as the sub- 
strate of both is outside the flow of time. The hunian adult body becomes 
the unmarked category-i.e., the cipher against which laboratory, social, 
and natural time can be coordinated. Indeed we could go one step fur- 
ther and see the adult male body as the unmarked category-since there 
are many more diseases restricted to women than restricted to men; there 
are sixteen categories or clusters of categories that apply only to males 
and forty-two that apply only to females (ICB-10,1992,vol. 2, p. 26). Femi- 
nist critics of medicine have long remarked on the relative pathologizing 
of the female body (Ehrenreich & English, 1973). 
Nobody Dies of Old Ape.‘ To finish with the life cycle before moving on to 
other temporal features, we should note that death itself is remarkably 
poorly defined in comparison to life. One can scarcely die of old age 
(Fagot-Ldrgeault, 1989). The closest that one may get comes under a 
banner disclaimer: 
ILL-DEFINEDAND U V K N O W  CAUSE OFMORBIDITYAND MOR7ALITY 
(797- 7 99) 




Senile asthenia exhaustion 
Excludes: senile psychoses (290.0-290.9)(ICD-9, 1996, vol. 1,p. 215) 
The ICDs life cycle for humans, then, is as follows: a spurt of intense activ- 
ity at birth; timeless adulthood, when one is afflicted with a range of woes 
that carry their own temporalities (more on this anon); and an inglorious 
ill-defined end. The effect of this is, paradoxically, to make the individual 
an undefined tabula rasa onto which various diseases are inscribed. From 
this blank sheet, one can read various stories (with the aid of the ICD), 
restoring first context and then interpretation (which we shall deal with 
in the next section). 
Time Story 2: The Virus 
Diseases themselves change over time. HIV, for example, mutates 
rapidly in the individual so that no two people suffer from the “same” 
disease nor may the disease be the same even within a person. This ex- 
treme variability of the object world is a problem for any classification 
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system. The case of virus classification illuminates many features of cat- 
egorizing difficulties and the strategies used to control them. We look 
here at some of the work of the International Committee on Taxonomy of 
Viruses (ICTV) (Murphy et al., 1995) so as to see how diseases that are 
present differently in every individual, and often vertiginously mutate, 
can be usefully classified. 
Throughout the history of virology, there have been acerbic debates 
over just what are viruses. The great virologist Lwoff, echoing Gertrude 
Stein no doubt, declaimed in 1953that “viruses should be considered as 
viruses because viruses are viruses” (Matthews, 1983,p. 7). Viruses them- 
selves have moved from scientific category to scientific category. In the 
early twentieth century, the central definition of a virus was entirely nega- 
tive. As Waterson and Wilkinson note, a virus was any disease organism 
which could be filtered through one of the “filter candles” developed for 
the purpose. This was a useful definition in that it excluded all other 
known disease agents; however, it did not guarantee the homogeneity of 
the category itself as Andrewes noted in 1930 when describing animal 
viruses: 
judgment must be suspended . . . in the case of the invisible viruses 
or so-called “filter-passing” organisms. Here our ignorance is almost 
complete; they are possibly a heterogeneous group but in the case of 
creatures which we cannot see and whose very existence is, in many 
cases, a matter of inference only, it is idle to talk of classification in 
the usual sense. (Matthews, 1983, p. 4) 
So there was no one definition, or rather, the ultimate encompassing re- 
sidual category. Here be dragons. 
Equally, there was no one discipline studying the matter of virus clas- 
sification. There was no study of virology per se until the 1980s. There 
was an apmom assumption, entrenched in disciplinary specialties, that ani- 
mal and plant viruses were not the same. This was disproved in the 1940s 
when it was shown that some plant viruses could also affect insects 
(Matthews, 1983, p. 7). Groups that were not used to working together 
were forced to cooperate, and they did not necessarily like it. As with the 
numerous and passionate battles between cladistics and numerical tax- 
onomy in biology (Duncan & Stuessy, 1984),there was a series of strong 
virological arguments that have left their traces in the literature. The 
arguments can be read in two ways. They are simultaneously about a 
struggle for professional authority on the part of the various disciplines 
involved and an attempt to find a single language with which to talk about 
the complex temporal and spatial properties of viruses. 
The role of the classification systems in knitting together (or not) the 
specialties is clear in all accounts of virus taxonomy. Matthews (1983) 
notes, “in the period 1966 to 1970 there was considerable controversy 
regarding some of the rules, which developed into a serious rift between 
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most of the plant virologists, and some animal virologists” (p. 13). He 
comments on Fenner’s presidency of the ICTV in the period 1970-1976: 
In retrospect perhaps the major contribution made by Fenner dur- 
ing his Presidency was to keep the plant virologists working within 
the ICTV organization. This really meant stopping the insistence of 
Lwoff‘s supporters 011a hierarchical classification and Latinized bi- 
nomials, and also, as noted earlier, deleting the rule regarding new 
sigla. In addition, Fenner exerted pressure to ensure that following 
two vertebrate virologists, a plant virologist should be the next Presi- 
dent of the  ICTV (p. 20) 
Murphy et al. (1995) note that even today: “Virus taxonomy is a polarizing 
subject when it comes up in hallway conversations.” They go on to praise 
the ICTV for its work of 
true international consensus building, and true pragmatism-and it 
has been successful. The work of the Committee has been published 
in a series of reports, the Reports ofthe International Committee on Tax-
onomy of Viruses, The Classification and Nomenclature of Viruses. These 
Reports have become part of the history and infrastructure of mod-
ern virolog. (p. v) 
We see then that the development of the classification system is an occa- 
sion for the construction of the community for which that system will act 
as information infrastructure. The system is built as a political compro- 
mise between specialties. The kinds of truth and the kinds of stories that 
it can contain by their nature recognize this. As Murphy et al. (1995) 
state, the resulting classification system is in some sense arbitrary: 
Today, there is a sense that a significant fraction of all existing viruses 
of humans, domestic animals and economically important plants have 
already been isolated and entered into the taxonomic system. . . . 
[The] present universal system of virus taxonomy is useful and us- 
able. It is set arbitrarily at hierarchical levels of order, family, sub- 
family, genus, and species. Lower hierarchical levels, such as subspe- 
cies, strain, variant, etc., are established by international specialty 
groups and by culture collections. (Murphy et al., 1995,p. 2) 
The apposition of specialty groups (professionalization work) and culture 
collections (naturalization work) is unsurprising; Murphy et al. (1995) 
offer it in a different form later in the same work: “Unambiguous virus 
identification is a major virtue of the universal system of taxonomy. . . and 
of particular value when the editor of a journal requires precise naming 
of viruses cited in a publication” (p. 7). 
Thus a first temporality associated with viruses is that the field itself 
has formed and changed rapidly, much like the organisms that it studies. 
This is an unsurprising echo, as the fact that the viruses transgress spatial 
boundaries and mutate enormously rapidly has contributed to the change. 
So what is the problem with correlating virus time with laboratory 
time? The overwhelming difficulty has been that it is extremely difficult 
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for viruses to produce the kind of “genetic classification” whose genealogy 
Patrick Tort (1989) has so brilliantly traced across the social and natural 
sciences of the nineteenth century. A genetic classification is one that 
classifies things according to their origins-rocks might be metamorphic 
or sedimentary; languages might be Indo-European or Nilotic. Viruses 
have multiple possible origins-i.e., they look and feel the same since 
they pass the filter test and make you sick, but they got that way along 
multiple paths. This is an old problem in medical philosophy and diagno- 
sis-a cure does not necessarily reflect a cause, and there may be many 
paths to a single symptom. 
Ward (1993) gives four theories for viral origins. First, it is possible 
that some viruses “evolved from autonomous, self-replicating host cell mol- 
ecules such as plasmids or transposons, by acquiring appropriate genes 
that code for packaging proteins” (p. 433). In this picture, they are simple 
chemical combinations that have acquired the replication habit of their 
material substrate. Second, “some viruses arose by degeneration from 
primitive cells in a manner similar to that proposed for the evolution of 
cellular organelles such as mitochondria and chloroplasts from bacteria” 
(p. 434). Here they are complex organisms that devolved. Third, “some 
RNA viruses are descendants of prebiotic RNA polymers” (p. 433). Ac-
cording to this theory, viruses might have co-evolved with life itself. Fi-
nally, there is the possibility that “some viruses evolved from viroids or 
virusoids, although it is equally possible that these small RNA, rather than 
being progenitors of viruses, are recent degenerative products of the more 
complex self-replicating systems” (p. 434). Where you do not have a 
single origin story, you cannot have a single biological classification sys-
tem. Viruses have been classed into families and then into increasingly 
controversial supervenient categories (only one “order”-the 
Mononegavirales-has been approved to date by the ICTV) . The super- 
venient categories frequently have the inconvenience of separating viruses 
that had been considered grouped together. With the lack of a single 
origin, the central class of virus “species” has been defined: “A virus spe- 
cies is a polythetic class of viruses constituting a replicating lineage and 
occupying a particular ecological niche” (Van Regenmortel, 1990,p. 49). 
A “polythetic” class is a class that is defined by the congruence of 
multiple characteristics no one of which is essential. The attribution of 
occupation of a particular niche is essential for dealing with obligate para- 
sites. This relatively loose definition opens up  a space for the 
professionalization work that needs to be done in conjunction with the 
alignment of competing temporalities (of the virus and of the laboratory). 
There has, in recent years, developed a line of argument that with ge- 
nome sequencing it will be possible to produce a coherent history of vi- 
ruses that will make the species concept more historically accurate. This 
reflects a wider trend across many social and natural sciences to recover 
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the origin-in geology, the tide has turned against uniformitarianism 
(Allegre, 1992); in philosophy, Foucault’s archeology has grown up in 
opposition to the postmodern denial of origins. However, even toddy a 
strictly genetic classification of viruses is possibly leading to category death: 
if mammalian viruses are descended from mammals, snake viruses 
from snakes, and honeybee viruses from honeybees, the group “vi- 
rus” would cease to have any formal classificatory validity. It could 
be retained as a nonclassificatory group, analogous to the group of 
“animals with wings,” but if it is not a monophyletic group, there is 
no doubt how cladism would deal with it; it presents no philosophi- 
cal difficulty: thc taxonomic category “virus” should be exploded. 
(Ridley, 1986,p. 51) 
The demotion to a nonclassificatory group would again have profcssional 
consequences. 
We see with the history of virus classification, then, that there has been 
a deliberate effort to create something that looks and feels like other bio- 
logical classifications, even though the virus itself transgresses basic catego- 
ries (it jumps across hosts of different kinds, steals from its host, mutates 
rapidly, and so forth). This has been somewhat of a deliberate political 
decision on the part of the international virus community: you need such 
classification systems in order to write scientific papers, provide keywords 
for indexing and abstracting, and compare results. Even in this most phe- 
nomenologitally difficult of cases, the world must still be dissected into rec- 
ognizable temporal and spatial units-partly because that is the way the world 
is and partly because that is the only way that science as we know it can work. 
STORIESOF CARVINGUP THE BODY: 
THEVERMILIONBORDEROF THE LIP 
In Regzonc of the Mznd, Leigh Star (1989) examined the ways in which 
researchers, seeking to localize cerebral functions, cut up the brain into 
meaningful units. The process is a messy one since brains themselves 
come in many shapes and sizes. During thc early days of research, a dia- 
gram of a “typical” monkey brain, with minutely locdlited and labeled 
regions, is transposed onto a representation of a human brain in an at- 
tempt to produce a standardized diagram. Human brains are of d much 
different size than monkey brains. Nevertheless, the need for standard- 
ized representations was so urgent that the physiologists overlooked this 
source of uncertainty, among others (Star, 1985). A similar problem oc- 
curs with the dissecting of bodies for medical purposes. Stefan Hirschauer 
(1991) has noted this for the practice of the surgeon’s trade; Berg and 
Bowker (1997) have discussed the same phenomenon with respect to the 
development of medical records. 
The ICD bears traces of this sort of uncertainty, most notably at limi- 
nal sites (those with borders that are unclear or are used in several different 
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categories), and with respect to roving categories like neoplasms (the can- 
cer may overlap the ICD categories). We can use the vermilion border of 
the lip, also known as the “lipstick area,” as a tracer for this. An early 
appearance in ICD-9-CM is as follows: 
4. Malignant neoplasms overlapping site boundaries 
Categories 140-195 are for  the classz@ation ofprimary malignant neopla.rms 
according to their point of origzn. A malignant neoplasm that ouerlaps two 
or more subcategories within a three-digit rubric and whose point of origzn 
cannot be determined should be classified to the subcategory .8 “Other” For 
example, “carcinoma involving tip and ventral surface of tongue” should be 
assz<ped to 141.8. O n  the other hand, “carcinoma of tip of tongme, extend- 
ing to involve the ventral surface” should be coded to 141.2, as the point of 
origin, the tip, is known. Three subcategories (149.8, 159.8, 165.8) have 
been provided for  malignant neoplasms that overlap the boundaries of three- 
digit rubrics within certain systems. Overlapping malignant neoplasms that 
cannot be classvied as indicated above should be assigned to the appropriate 
subdivision of category 195 (Malignant neoplasm of other and ill-defined 
sites), 




lipstick area. (ID-9-CM, 1996,vol. 1, p. 26) 
The “NOS” in this classification stands for “not otherwise specified”-a 
protean modifier throughout the classification. 
If we consider ICD as a prototype classification system, we can see the 
way of treating the vermilion border as part of a general strategy of distin- 
guishing central members of certain categories from outliers. The vermil- 
ion border is strictu sensu part of the skin of the lip, but it is not a good 
member of that category: 
173.0 Skin of lip 

Excludes: vermilion border of lip (140.0-140.1, 140.9) (ICD-PCM, 1996, 

vol. I ,  p. 32) 

Equally, it is definitely skin but is a special subcategory: 
238.2 Skin 
Excludes: anus NOS (235.5) 
skin of genital organs (236.3, 236.6) 
vermilion border of lip (235.1) (ICD-9-CM, 1996, vol. 1, p. 45) 
Or again, it is definitely soft tissue but is an outlier: 
239.2 Bone, soft tissue, and skin 
Excludes: 	 . . . 

. . .  

vermilionborderof lip (239.0). (ICD-PCM,1996,vol. 1, pp. 45-46) 
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In ICO-10,its marginality is explicit: 





Vermilion border of lip. (ICD-10, 1992, vol. 1,p. 222) 
This multiple reference to the vermilion border ofthe lip is a typical ICD 
naming strategy. If a region of the body might fall under several catego- 
ries, its membership in a special category is explicitly marked. 
In principle at least, the world itself-that messy, sprawling, 
sociotechnical system-should be divided into regions of relevant causal 
occurrence. The ICDs work here is necessarily far from complete. Here, 
however, is one typically precise definition of a liminal zone in the outside 
world: 
A public highway (trafway) or street is thr entire zuidth between property 
line,$(or other boundary lines) of ermy way orplace, of which any part is open 
lo thr use of the public for purposes of vehicular traffic as a matter of right or 
custom. A roadiuay is that part of the public highway drsigned, improved, and 
ordinarily usrd, for vehicular travel. (ICD-9,1996,vol. 1, p. 274) 
The ICD records accident statistics, including the place or mode. Such 
precision is needed for the compilation of, for example, effective safety 
statistics. This drive for precision is in principle unending-how much of 
the social and natural worlds would have to be described within the ICD in 
order to produce an exhaustive system? 
The point here is not that these are bad definitions of lipstick areas 
and streets. It is that they are ineluctably arbitrary ways of cutting up the 
world. The goal with a classification system is to produce homogeneous 
causal regions. Homogeneous causal regions are zones without effective 
subdivision. For the vermilion border, there is no real distinction between 
upper and lower; for streets, there is no real distinction between tarred 
and gravel. There is no possiblity, in principal, that this can be other than 
a bootstrapping operation. All research work that explores medical cau- 
sality has the ZCD or a similar system as its base referent and so necessarily 
assumes the ICDs set of homogeneous regions in order to design its tests, 
experiments, or projects. It is analytically always possible to act otherwise 
and carve the world up differently into other kinds of causal regions. Latour 
(1987) reminds us of this in Science in Action. He posits the thought ex- 
periment: How would someone challenge the basic premises of quantum 
mechanics? No one would deny that it is possible that these premises are 
wrong nor that an experiment might be designed to prove this. However, 
the economic and administrative cost of doing so would be huge. Who 
would fund the proposal? Who would referee the papers? How, in short, 
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would the inertia of the networks involved be overcome? In the same way, 
it is always possible (and somewhat more common than in the quantum 
mechanics case) to challenge basic ICD categories. However, it is in prac- 
tice much easier to hypostatize and duplicate them for local usage. 
Exceptions occur when particular categories are linked with social move- 
ments and social problems; an outstanding example of this occurred with 
the de-medicalization of homosexuality in the DSM-3after challenges from 
the gay community (Kirk & Kutchins, 1992). 
We have seen in this section that medical classifications split up the 
world into useful categories. They do not describe the world as it is in any 
simple sense. They necessarily model it. This modeling within classifica- 
tion systems of all sorts is where the real work gets done in terms of the 
enfolding of social, political, and organizational agendas into the scien- 
tific work of describing nature-in this case, in the form of disease entities. 
INTERPRETATION INTO THE ICDIS ALSO ENFOLDED 
We saw in the last section how the ICD divides the world into standard 
Aristotelian units of time and place and, in doing so, how it produces 
favored readings of the body and of the world at large. The WHO goes 
one step further. It not only provides, through the ICD, a set of possible 
stories, it also provides, bundled up in the classification system, explicit 
rules for the interpretation of those stories. 
In order to follow this through, we need to look at the form of the 
standard international death certificate (see Figure 2 above). Ann Fagot- 
Largeault (1989) has done a wonderful philosophical analysis of this docu- 
ment; our own description will not attempt to be as complete. It is the 
death certificate that constitutes the archetypical use of the ICD-indeed, 
until ICD-5, the classification only covered causes of mortality and did not 
seek to represent morbidity. The death certificate itself has as a major 
heading, “Cause of Death.” It is split into sections, “Cause of Death,” 
“Approximate interval between onset and death,” and other contributing 
factors or significant conditions. 
It is a difficult task to summarize a complex series of conditions to a 
single cause of death, and the work of interpretation begins on the form 
itself. A single cause is favored for very practical reasons. In the first 
place, it is hard enough to compile statistics at all, and the task could get 
overwhelming if multiple causes were allowed. Further, a single cause of 
death provides the lowest common denominator over multiple collection 
systems-from medical examiners in a large hospital to medical parapro- 
fessionals in the underdeveloped rural areas. Finally, as the ICD’s devel-
opers point out, the goal of the classification system is not to describe 
complex phenomenologies but to prevent death: 
From the standpoint of prevention of death, it is necessary to break 
the chain of events or to effect a cure at some point. The mosteffective 
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public health objective is to prevent the precipitating cause from o p  
crating. For the purpose, the underlying cause has been defined as 
“(a) the disease or injury which initiated the train of morbid events 
leading directly to death, or (b) the circumstances of the accident or 
violence which produced the fatal injury.’’ (ICB-10,1992, vol. 2, p. 31) 
This statement revealingly indicates a recognition by the system’s devel- 
opers that reality is indeed more complex than their registration system 
can describe. All the analytic points made to date in this discussion can 
be read into this one statement: the ICD is a pragmatic classification (“the 
most effective public health objective” [p. 31]), and it divides the world 
spatially and temporally into causal zones that underwrite preferred sto- 
ries (“itis necessary to break the chain of event .at some point” [p.311). 
The cause of death as given on the death certificate by the attending 
physician is frequently not, as Fagot-Largeault (1989) points out, the cause 
of death that is entered into the statistical record. The classifications en- 
tered on the certificate are themselves systematically re-coded so as to 
constrain the kinds of story that the statistics tell. 
One standard algorithm is that precision always beats no precision 
(this is an echo ofJohn King’s [personal communication] wonderful ob-
servation about technical arguments in the policy domain: “[N]umbers 
beat no numbers every time”). On a deeper epistemological level, the s u h  
stitution of precision for validity is often a needed expedient in getting 
work done (Star, 1989; Kirk & Kutchins, 1992). It may also become a kind 
of gatckeeping tool in theoretically defining a ground of knowledge. It 
functions as follows in the ICD 
Where the selected cause describes a condition in general terms and 
a term that provides more precise information about the site or na- 
ture of this condition is reported on the certificate, prefer the more 
informative term. This rule will often apply when the general term 
becomes an adjectiv?, qualifying thr more precise term. 
“Example 57: I (a) Meningitis 
Tuberculosis 
Code to tuberculous meningitis (A17.0). The conditions are stated 
in the correct causal relationship.” (ICD-10, 1992, vol. 2, p. 48) 
This is doubtless a very reasonable rule. However, it is significant that it 
sets in motion a process that begins placing mediating layers between what 
the doctor says and what gets reported. 
In general, these mediating layers refashion the story that the act of 
classification permits. The records clerk is given the license to change the 
doctor’s classification in such a way that i t  will reflect the best current 
medical theories: 
Rule?. If the condition selected by the General Principle3 or by Rule 
1 or Rule 2 is obviously a direct consequcrice of another reported 
condition, whether in Part I or Part IT, select this primary condition. 
( I D - l o ,1992, vol. 2, p. 34) 
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Thus, for example, 
[w]here the selected cause is a trivial condition unlikely to cause 
death and a more serious condition is reported, reselect the under- 
lying cause as if the trivial condition had not been reported. If the 
death was the result of an adverse reaction to treatment of the trivial 
condition, select the adverse reaction. (KB-20,1992,vol. 2, p. 45) 
Derrida (1980) reminds us that it is through what is excluded as trivial 
that we can frequently understand systems of thought by pointing directly 
at what is important. Similarly, this opening of the door to an undeter- 
mined attribution of triviality is one significant moment, hidden in the third 
volume of a massive classification system, where the work of reifying cur- 
rent categories is done. Only certain causal chains will be permitted at the 
moment of classification. This in turn naturally impacts the interpretation 
at the other end of “raw data” in the form of epidemiological statistics: 
The expression “highly improbable” has been used since the Sixth 
Revision of the ICD to indicate an unacceptable causal relationship. 
As a guide to the acceptability of sequences in the application of the 
General Principle and the selection rule?, the following relationships 
should be regarded as “highly improbable.” (ICD-10,1992,vol. 2, p. 67) 
After this passage, there follows a series of unacceptable chains. For ex- 
ample, a malignant neoplasm cannot be reported as “due to” any other 
disease than HIV; haemophilia cannot be “due to” anything, and no acci- 
dent can be reported as due to any other cause-except epilepsy (ICD-10, 
1992, vol. 2, p. 68). 
An acceptable string of classifications in a death certificate is one which 
fits into an internally consistent chain that reflects current medical knowl- 
edge. In the process of arriving at such a chain, all qualifiers should be 
removed: “Qualifying expressions indicating some doubt as to the accu- 
racy of the diagnosis, such as ‘apparently,’ ‘presumably,’ ‘possibly,’ etc., 
should be ignored, since entries without such qualification differ only in 
the degree of certainty of the diagnosis” (ICD-10, 1992, vol. 2, p. 88). 
In the process of achieving this certainty, multiple causality often has 
to be arbitrarily collapsed into unicausality-here by a principle of first 
come first served: 
If several conditions that cannot be coded together are recorded as 
the “main condition,” and other details on the record point to one 
of them as the “main condition” for which the patient received care, 
select that condition. Otherwise select the condition first mentioned. 
(ICD-20, 1992,V O ~ .2, p. 106) 
Any working classification system will have such standard rules attached. 
Such rules are theoretically interesting for several reasons. First, the ICD 
developers have explicitly recognized that it is not enough to control the 
classification (the name of the disease). They also have to attempt to 
exercise control over the language game in which the classification is 
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inserted-this indeed is the purpose of the rules contained in volume 2. 
This attention to both the base level and its meta-level is a bureaucratic 
necessity that simultaneously conjures the wild world of the patient’s body 
into the ordered world of medical knowledge. Second, the rules them- 
selves serve to systematically reduce ambiguity and uncertainty, even where 
these are integral to the attendant physician’s depiction of the situation 
of the patient. Those who see the patients are aware of this uncertainty; 
those who apply the rules also know of it; those who read the final statis- 
tics are shielded from it. The patients live it. Finally, there is of course a 
potential infinite regress in the control of, first, the name of the disease, 
then on rules for using these names and so forth. The final level at which 
regress occurs is in the presentation of results. The WHO recognizes 
that, when dealing with small populations, you can get wild fluctuations of 
information on mortality or morbidity from year to year. In order to achieve 
stability and certainty at this level, one needs to sacrifice precision: to go 
up to broader ICD rubrics, aggregate data over a longer period, use the 
broadest of the recommended age groupings and aggregate areas (ICB-
10, 1992, vol. 2, p. 137).’ The regress itself to ever higher levels of control 
marks the fact that the world is always slightly out of reach-it cannot be 
contained in the classification system, or the system plus set of rules, or 
the system plus set of rules for interpretation plus set of rules for change, 
or the system plus set of rules for interpretation plus set of rules for change 
plus set of rules for presentation. 
CONCLUSION 
At the start of this discussion, we looked at two basic kinds of classifi- 
cation system-i.e., Aristotelian and prototype. We have seen in the course 
of our analysis that medical classification systems are “naturally” proto- 
typical and that they nevertheless have to appear Aristotelian in order to 
bear the bureaucratic burden that is put on them. This burden is to act as 
a gateway between the world of the laboratory and the hospital (with 
precisely defined closed environments) and the workaday world. As we 
consider the stories embedded in the system, from the point of view of 
work and practice, we understand that both the “intuitive” and the “tech- 
nical” are always present in systems such as the ZCB. 
The way in which this gateway function is provided is twofold. First, 
the Aristotelian classification embeds within itself a set of implicit narra- 
tives that align the artificial categories of the ICI) with the real world. 
Second, the rules for interpretation and presentation sit on top of the ICD 
and nudge its categories along prepared legitimate pathways. This com- 
bination of embedded and supervenient narrative provides the “give” 
through which the prototypical classification can be made to look and 
feel Aristotelian. 
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Increasingly, we will see work classifications and formal library classi- 
fications merging in the digital library of the future-the UMLS, which 
includes both the ICD and classifications of nursing work, among others, 
is a good example. In this discussion, the argument has been made that, 
as this happens, we need to pay due attention to the political and ethical 
undergirding of classification systems before they become so deeply 
inscribed in our information infrastructure that they are lost to sight (while 
their consequences propagate). 
NOTES’ One finds similar complaints today about the World Wide Web to the point where a 
special electronic journal has been founded: Journal of Internet Cataloging: The Interna- 
tional Quartmly of Di,ptal Organization, Classification, and Access. Retrieved September 25, 
1998 from the World Wide Web: htrp://jic.libraries.psu.edu/. See also Marcia Bates’s 
(In press) excellent article on incomparability between Web search engines. 
Ironically, the slogan, “nobody dies of old age” was an anti-ageist aphorism first popular 
in the 1980s and used by groups such as the Grey Panthers. It was meant to imply that 
the social invisibility of old people led to them being medically invisible or overlooked 
as well. It is an interesting example of the inversion of the prototypical and Aristotelian 
aspects of death. ’ The general Principle is: “when more than one condition is entered on the certificate, 
the condition entered alone on the lowest used line of Part I should be selected only if 
it could have given rise to all the conditions entered above it.” (p. 34)
‘	Recommended age groupings and rrgional groupings are: 
<1, 1-4, 5 year groups from 5-84, 85+ 
<1, 1-4, 5-14, 15-24, 25-34, 35-44, 45-54, 55-64, 65-74, 75+ 
< I ,  1-14, 15-44, 45-64, 65+ (128) 
“Classification by area should, as appropriate, be in accordance with: 
each major civil division; 
each town or conurbation of 1,000,000 population and over, otherwise the largest town 
with a population of at least 100,000; 

a national aggregate of urban areas of 100,000 population and over; 

a national aggregate of urban areas of less than 100,000 popu1ation;a national aggregate 

of rural areas.” (p. 128) 
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